if I told you that I had carefully weighed my abilities and interests -strong but not Putnam Prize level math abilities, strong but not Chekhov level writing abilities, strong but not Nelson Mandela level social concerns -against the payoffs to those abilities/interests in different professions and determined that economics was the best fit.
At some level, Invisible Hand explanations of career choice work as a good first approximation for many of us. In a sample of thousands of young persons choosing careers, I almost surely would be in the set of those who fit economics and not in the set of those who fit pro wrestling (save as a manager or script writer). But I am also sure that many in the suitable-for-economics set chose other occupations -law, literature, investment banking, sociology, and so on. Economic models of individual outcomes invariably have huge residuals that tell us that they miss much about what determines individual choices and payoffs.
The economics of education, for example, lives on the fact that education raises earnings. But regressions of ln earnings on formal education, however measured, explain less than 5% of the variance in ln earnings. Within each education group, there is a huge dispersion of earnings among observationally equivalent people that dwarfs the variance across the groups. Economics majors from Harvard of the same age, gender and race and with similar grades, for instance, will have very different earnings ten or twenty years later. One may end up a six-digit earner while another struggles to keep up with the bills.
In physical science, it is irrelevant which rapidly moving atom interacts with neighboring atoms to equilibrate the level of heat in some closed space or which molecules interact with other molecules to form a chemical compound. The atoms and molecules are identical. But our genes and environment make humans heterogeneous, and we invariably ponder the unique factors or accidents that lead us down one path over another. Unless the cosmologists' hypothesized multiverse is true, there is no way to test any story of how idiosyncratic events affect long term outcomes, and even then it would require traveling to other universes, Dr.
Who style. The most we can do is tell a consistent believable story about why we got to where we are.
What set me up to choose economics was Isaac Asimov's Foundation series of science fiction books. 1 The 1st volume of the series laid out the key proposition that, Hari Seldon be praised, it was possible to construct a science of history.
Equations based on verified knowledge could predict the flow of history -at least up to the point where uncertainty allowed the heroes of the series to gain better outcomes for humanity through their brave deeds. The 2nd volume of the series taught the reader that economics dominated military power in determining history. The Foundation expanded through its trading practices. Free trade helped it survive the efforts of the mighty Empire to crush it.
I read the Foundation series in junior high school when I caught the learning bug and spent every free moment devouring any 50 cent paperback on whatever caught my fancy -history, literature, science fiction, Greek culture, religion, philosophy, psychology, astronomy, jazz, mathematics, whatever. It was a mad effort to learn all there was to know about anything and everything. There were no interesting economics books in paperback 2 to compete with George Gamow or Edith Hamilton, with Asimov and the other science fiction stars, or with Euripides and Sophocles and the Bhagavad-Gita or Chekhov or Scott Fitzgerald. So my first appreciation of social science and the power of economics came from the Foundation series. My guess is that most junior high school devotees of science fiction are entranced by the speculative physical science and go on to careers as inventors, engineers, scientists. What I took away was the notion that the aggregation of individual actions rather than the decisions of kings and queens determined the flow of history and that it was possible at least in the far-off future to write down equations that would predict how those actions determined the flow of history. Wow! In college, I quickly learned that history was not a science; that sociology explored fascinating problems with no clear conceptual framework; and that while experiments made psychology a science its focus on the individual offered no insight into how behavior aggregated to produce historical change. By contrast, economics had the logical structure of science and dealt with micro and aggregate behavior in ways that could illuminate the dynamics of historical development. To understand the broad sweep of history, one had to begin with economics, or so it seemed to me. I bet that Hari Seldon studied economics before writing down the dynamic general equilibrium equations that underlay the Foundation series.
Still, there were aspects of economics that troubled me. Economics lacked the verifiable facts and invariant relations that characterized experimental sciences. It relied too much on abstract principles and too little on careful investigation of actual behavior for my taste. The applied calculus of price theory seemed far removed from business reality, at least as presented in undergraduate micro-theory. If all that was required to run a successful business was to differentiate profits functions, why were managers so highly paid? If they did more than that, why we were not taught what they did? When I posed these questions after one particularly tiresome class, the answer that there was a gap between theory and reality did not sit well with me. Science is supposed to fit reality. Why didn't economists start filling in the reality instead of fussing with indifference curves and tangent lines and, even worse, Edgeworth-Bowley boxes?
Wouldn't it be better to learn the calculus stuff fast and spend the rest of the time trying to understand the real world?
In grad school I read Samuelson's Foundations and loved it. That was the way to teach economic theory. But I wanted more from economics than the mathematics of optimization. I wanted economics to answer the big Hari Seldon questions. What leads some societies to succeed and others to fail? Can a society organized around the interactions of ordinary folk (the Foundation) defeat a totalitarian juggernaut run from on high (the Empire)? That was a real issue in the 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet economy seemed to grow faster than the US economy (few realized how inefficient the Soviet system was or that the service sector rather than heavy manufacturing was the economic future). By allocating resources through central planning the Soviets had developed an advanced military technology that risked blowing us all up.
One of the supposed advantages of the Soviet system was that the state could order young people to go into engineering and science and work on projects the state deemed in the national interest while the US let immature young people like me freely choose careers of lesser import, such as economics. Did this mean that the Soviets would ultimately surpass us? Or was the market analysis right that allowing individuals to choose careers freely gave better outcomes? The issue of whether enough young Americans study science and engineering to maintain the country's technological and economic success has resurfaced several times since then. In the mid 2000s it produced a spate of reports calling for more science and engineering of which the National Academy of Sciences' Gathering Storm attracted most attention. 3 What I didn't know when I was choosing a career was that the National Science Foundation counts economics as a genuine science. But before that goes to your head, fellow followers of the Invisible Hand, the NSF counts sociology also! In grad school, I looked for the branch of economics that would best help me address the "really big" questions. Initially, economic development seemed to fit the bill. Understand why country A grows and country B does not and you The balanced growth models that were the rage at the time were too far removed from the evidence to be useful. Kuznets bemoaned in class that he could not understand why theorists built such models when the essence of development was unbalanced growth. Kuznets was a great antidote to theory without evidence.
What I took away from this experience was that the "big questions" were too hard to attack directly. One had to come at them from a base of real knowledge, which meant from applied microeconomics where data related to actual behavior in market settings. If the interactions of millions of people determined the future then we should study the behavior of those people -how they responded to economic stimuli and how their responses generated new stimuli. Labor economics came closest to trying to do this. It sought to understand the behavior of workers and firms inductively from observation and data rather than deductively from maximizing models. As a bonus, it dealt with unions and social movements that could affect society and the flow of history outside of economic markets. I decided that the road to understanding development and the big questions of history ran through labor. Maybe, he suggested half-joking, I should wait a decade or so for some more observations before I called this. With more data, there was also the potential of building a more sophisticated model. But whereas a tenured professor like Schultz could wait for another cycle or so, a new PhD couldn't, so I proceeded to publish my thesis work. 6 What made me confident that I had the basic story right -that supply was quite elastic to economic opportunity -was that my survey of students showed that they were reasonably informed about pay and employment opportunities, paid attention to salaries on the margin, knew something about the life cycle pattern of earnings in different fields, and so on. Yoram Ben-Porath suggested that I probe the link between starting salaries and expected lifetime earnings and the relevance of rational expectations to the cycles in a more structured model. Perhaps I should have followed his advice but I didn't. Discovering the basic patterns and finding a simple parsimonious story was great fun. I was uneasy about pushing weak data too far into a particular framework. What I did instead was to carry the analysis to other fields where one's major was closely linked to one's occupation, such as physics, and was reassured to find that supply looked elastic in enough areas that the pattern was not a fluke. 7 Since then I have worked on a host of labor issues -from unions to crime to modes of compensation to labor standards to discrimination to labormanagement relations to welfare states, etc; and have studied labor markets in Asia (Korea, Australia, China, Japan, Sri Lanka), Europe (Sweden, Ireland, Germany, the UK, Spain, Norway, Poland); Latin America (Argentina, Dominican
Republic, Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Chile); and Africa (South Africa). Recently, I have returned to studying the science and engineering work force, though now in the context of globalization and with greater attention to the demand side of the market, as I will describe later. Someone looking at my portfolio of topics might wonder if I was a mad hatter, caught up with wanderlust, a jet setter seeking thrills in world hot spots, a secret agent for the CIA or M5, or a fugitive from the police. Every once in a while I get suspicious looks from immigration officials at airports, but I just say professor of economics and that establishes that I am harmless (if they only knew the trouble we can cause, at least when we are defunct!)
Let me explain what motivated some of the topics and mode of research.
The second area on which I worked in depth was black-white economic differences. What grabbed my attention was that just as economists were modeling discriminatory differences as an equilibrium process resulting from statistical discrimination or from the Becker model of how fixed prejudicial tastes produced segregation or income differences in competitive markets, young blacks were making unprecedented gains in earnings and occupational status. The sudden rise in relative black incomes after the 1964 Civil Rights Act could not possibly result from gradual changes in tastes or in statistical discrimination. Shades of Kuznets, why were theorists modeling equilibrium when the data pointed to change? Examining CPS and Census figures on black and white earnings and occupational attainment I found that the post-1964 gains occurred largely among young college educated workers and were greatest in the South. Visiting the historically black colleges, most of whose graduates had gone into teaching and public service I learned that before the Act virtually no US corporation recruited at those colleges, whereas after the Act, corporations came to recruit in droves. In response, students were shifting rapidly from teaching and social work into business majors. My interpretation was that the change in the law was driving demand along an elastic supply curve. 8 That the Civil Rights Act was the main exogenous factor raising demand was controversial. Some analysts argued that the late 1960s boom caused the shift in demand. Others said that the increased salaries for new graduates reflected their choosing high wage/low investment jobs. Others argued that the gains in wages reflected increased welfare rolls, which reduced the supply of black workers.
Many on the left objected to my optimistic reading of the decline in discriminatory income differences: why did I stress that the glass was half full when it was half empty? My response was that it was filling up from all empty before.
If government actions were important in reducing discrimination, perhaps government actions had also been important in maintaining black-white differences in the years following Emancipation. Examining the historical data, I
found that government actions -the discriminatory behavior of southern stateshad played a huge role in preventing black Americans from advancing in the labor market for decades. I read Horace Mann Bond and histories of Southern states that documented the discriminatory policies and legal and illegal efforts to prevent blacks from investing in skills and advancing in the job market. One of the biggest mistakes of my career was that, wanting and failing to develop a purely economic theory of why poor whites aligned with wealthy whites rather than with poor blacks in Reconstruction days when both seemed possible, I never brought that historical work to completion.
Ensuing studies have confirmed the view that government policy sparked the increased demand for black workers. Where I was wrong was to think that the rise in black incomes was going to continue smoothly to equalize incomes with whites save for differences in background factors, which invariably would take a long time to work out. While black college graduates were advancing into better jobs, young less educated black men were having greater problems in the job market. 9 An increasing number were involved in crime and ended up spending years incarcerated. My interest in the economics of crime came from realizing that crime was a major part of the poverty problem facing black Americans. The US could not cure poverty unless it cured the crime problem and conversely. Curing crime, in turn, required that we understand the supply behavior of young black men living in the inner city. So how did they go about making their career decisions?
To find out I developed the NBER Inner City Youth Survey that focused on illuminating how young inner city men saw the risks and rewards to crime compared to the opportunities, or lack thereof, of employment and earnings in the legitimate economy. 10 One of the lessons from studying youth crime is that the line between legitimate work and crime is porous. Youths shift back and forth depending on opportunities. Later I realized also that excluding the huge Hirschman's analysis from a broad framework for thinking about political vs market responses to problems into a testable model of behavior. Unions were collective voice. This meant they should reduce quits via the exitvoice tradeoff and should provide information to firms about worker preferences that would affect many parts of the labor contract, which in turn would lead firms to change their labor practices. Unions were institutions that affected the entire workplace, not just pay. 13 Suddenly there seemed to be lots of things to study about unions with then newly available large computerized data sets on workers and establishments.
Ensuing work by me and others at Harvard and NBER quantified the impacts of unions in the private sector on economic outcomes such as the composition of compensation, the dispersion of pay within firms, productivity, profits, age or experience earnings profiles, layoffs, capital-labor substitution, and extended the analysis of the union wage effect to examine how it varied with the union share of a market. In 1984, after five or so years working this topic, I summarized (with James Medoff) the findings in What do Unions Do -a book that owes much to the editor of Basic Books, Martin Kessler, who kept pushing for clarity and social significance. 14 The bottom line of quantifying the "two faces of unionism" -voice and monopoly -was a relatively favorable assessment of unions: the voice impact of the institution had greater social effects than the monopoly impact. Unions reduced inequality by compressing wages within workplaces and by shrinking the pay gap between white collar and managerial workers and production workers.
Unions raised savings through negotiated pension programs, and so on. detailed studies by dozens of researchers focused on differences between the US and EU labor markets. 19 The project leaders summarized the findings in their volumes in Working Under Different Rules. 20 The NBER labor group has also compared the US and Canadian labor markets, studied the welfare state in Sweden, examined the British economy in the 2000s, and investigated youth labor markets in diverse advanced countries. 21 The work highlights the payoff from workers covered by different plans and found that worker co-monitoring was an important force in fighting the incentive to free ride. Workers covered by group incentive pay were more likely to act against shirkers than workers paid in other ways. We also found that shared capitalism gave better outcomes for workers and firms when management combined it with complementary labor policies and practices, which might reflect some underlying latent variable such as the corporate culture that business folk and business school profs sometimes invoked to explain differences in corporate performances. 22 My with Kimberly Elliot demonstrates further that globalization and labor standards are complementary rather than antithetical developments, contrary to the fear of many on the left that globalization forces firms to reduce standards. 23 What makes the market for standards unique is that the entrepreneurs are human rights activists who galvanize consumer sentiment to pressure firms to improve conditions to avoid losing sales.
The second issue, which has become common wisdom in discussions of globalization and labor, is that globalization's big impact on labor around the world began when China, India, and the ex-Soviet bloc (all of whom had previously operated as autarkies) joined the global capitalist system in the 1990s.
These countries brought lots of low skilled labor and little useful capital to the world economy, which effectively doubled the size of the global work force. The ensuing reduction in the capital/labor ratio underlies, I claimed, most of the impacts of globalization on labor: the shift in bargaining power toward capital, the changing patterns of trade and foreign direct investment, and the off shoring of work. This is a case of seeing the forest because you haven't studied the trees.
The third issue, which occupies my research today, has a Hari Seldon quality to it. This is the impact of the spread of university education and knowledge around the world on economic development and in particular on the growth of useful knowledge. Technologists such as Ray Kurzweil argue that the increased power of computers will accelerate our control over nature, producing a "singularity" in history. 24 Without gainsaying the gigabytes of computing power, I
stress the growing number of science and engineering specialists around the world. With more highly educated science and engineering specialists today than in all previous times taken together, connected through the Internet, and, yes, with access to powerful computers, we have the potential for a singularity-type explosion of useful knowledge that could go a long way to solving the great problems we face in the areas of climate change, energy, pressures on natural resources (water, food, minerals, metals), disease and illness and so on.
Turning that potential into reality is an economics problem of the first magnitude in allocating and managing human resources. Given the uncertainty of research, the political economy of the allocation of budgets, and problems in Sam Beckett ends The Unnamable with "Where I am I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on." Economists don't know the answers to Hari Seldon future-of-history questions. Perhaps we'll never know them. But moving toward answers through smaller manageable questions, creating and analyzing data, interacting with the practitioners in the world whose behavior we study (workers, union leaders, business leaders, scientists, engineers, whoever) is not dismal science. No way. It is fun -more fun, as best I can tell, than making money as an investment banker,
McKinsey consultant, or used car salesman, or eve than theorizing on a blackboard in some dark office. And it is more important. With apologies to Beckett, I feel more strongly than when I began that we can and will break the silence of not knowing. I intend to go on searching for answers to the questions that seem important. I hope you will do the same. May your new research and mine illuminate important social phenomenon and justify all that fun to the world. 
